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The past years have seen a clear and incontrovertible rise in the use of
international financial and commercial instruments' expressed to be
governed by Islamic principles.2 Banks and other commercial entities in
*Jason Chuah is a Reader in Commercial Law at the University of Westminster, London,
United Kingdom. He is also a Visiting Lecturer at University College London and
Cambridge University. Mr. Chuah is grateful to the delegates at the Conference on Law and
Commerce jointly organized by the International Islamic University of Malaysia and
Victoria University, Australia, at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia which was held on September
28-29, 2005 for their helpful comments in the presentation of this paper. Mr. Chuah would
also like to thank the reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Mr. Chuah, however,
retains responsibility for any errors.
1 Such instruments might include investment contracts, their associated guarantees,
general financing agreements, suretyship, franchise agreements, commercial agency
agreements, Islamic letters of credit, Islamic insurance agreements ("takaful"), etc. There is
also no distinction made between agreements involving states as parties, the criterion being
the provision, and the receipt of commercial or financial services.
2 This article will not go into the intricacies of the debate on the how these Islamic forms
of commerce/finance are to be structured and applied. As a general preface, however, most
Islamic scholars agree that the premise of Islamic finance lies in the abrogation of interest
(riba) and unpredictability (gharar). Morabaha, iarah, modarabah and musharakah are
common forms of Islamic commercial or financial instruments which avoid riba and gharar.
Morabaha is usually described as 'cost-plus financing' and frequently appears as a form of
trade finance using letters of credit. It involves the sale of goods on a deferred basis. The
goods are delivered immediately and the price to be paid will include a mutually agreed
margin of profit payable to the seller. In this contract, the market cost price (the true cost) is
shared with the buyer at the time of concluding the sale. Ijarah is a form of leasing whereby
a known benefit (usufruct) associated with the asset is sold for a payment. In the course of
this sale of usufruct, ownership of the asset is not transferred. Instead, the bank maintains
ownership of the asset. The contract may allow the bank either to take title of the asset at the
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:137 (2006)
Islamic and non-Islamic countries are increasingly aware of the commercial
need to offer services which are specifically tailored to meet this sector of
the international market. Disputes over the interpretation and application of
such instruments invariably arise. English courts are not insulated from
such disputes, given that the City of London is at the forefront of many
international commercial and financial dealings. As a matter of law, the
question of what law or legal principles should govern the instrument or
contract must necessarily be determined. That was indeed the case in
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Limited.3
This article uses the Shamil Bank case to explore the issue of how
compliance with Islamic principles might best be achieved in a financing
agreement governed by English law. In particular, it discusses at some
length how the author views that the incorporation of Islamic principles
might be best achieved, in English law, by means of the proper construction
of the contract. Closely allied to that issue is an examination of the English
Court of Appeal's approach to the issue of incorporation of Islamic
principles into the financing agreement.
Shamil Bank also raises the issue of whether parties could choose
Islamic law, as a generic and non-country specific system of law, to serve
as the applicable or proper law of the commercial transaction. This area of
law is primarily governed by the Rome Convention,4 ("the Convention"), as
end of the lease term or to sell the asset to the customer at the end of the lease period.
modarabah works on the basis that a mudarib or entrepreneur will provide management
expertise as capital. The investor is known as the rabb al-mal who bears all losses of
invested assets. The share of expected future profits between the mudarib(s) and the
investor(s) is agreed at the outset in any ratio mutually agreed to by the parties involved.
With the musharakah, all the parties are involved in a partnership arrangement and must
contribute funds, but they will all have the right to exercise executive powers in the venture.
See generally Dinar Standard: Business Strategies for the Muslim World,
http://www.dinarstandard.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) for an introduction to Islamic
business concepts. See also Rodney Wilson, The Evolution of the Islamic Financial System,
in ISLAMIC FINANCE: INNOVATION AND GROWTH 29 (Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim & Simon
Archer eds., 2002) for a recent analysis of these concepts. For background information on
the topic of Islamic Banking, see generally J. Michael Taylor, Islamic Banking-The
Feasibility of Establishing an Islamic Bank in the U.S., 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 385 (2003);
Humayon Dar & John Presley, Lack of Profit Loss Sharing in Islamic Banking, 2 INT'L J.
ISLAMIC FIN. SERV. 1 (2000); Goharb Bilal, Islamic Finance: Alternatives to the Western
Model, FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 145 (1999); Institute of Islamic Banking and
Insurance, http://www.islamic-banking.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2006); International
Journal of Islamic Financial Services, http://islamic-finance.net/journals (last visited Oct. 10,
2006).
3 [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2118 (Eng.), [2003] 2 All E.R. 849 (Comm) (Eng.), affid,
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 19 (Eng.), [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1784 (Civ) (Eng.).
4 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations opened for signature in
Rome on June 19, 1980. 1980 O.J. (L 226), 19 I.L.M. 1492 (1980) [hereinafter Rome
Convention]. The Rome Convention was negotiated and written by the European Union.
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incorporated into English law by means of an Act of Parliament, the
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 ('the Act").5  The Convention was
intended to harmonize the rules relating to the proper law of the contract
amongst E.U. Member States. The traditional English common law proper
law of contract doctrine has been replaced;6 the Act, and consequently, the
The United Kingdom signed on to the Rome Convention on December 7, 1981. Although
the Rome Convention is mostly a measure of E.U. law, id. art. 2, and indeed requires
contracting states to refer any questions of law to the European Court and to decide any such
question in accordance with the principles laid down by the European Court, id. art. 3,
Article 2 makes it plain that any law specified by the Convention shall be applied whether or
not it is the law of a contracting state. Id. art. 2.
5 Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, c. 36 (U.K.).
6 F. A. Mann commented: "The Act replaces one of the great achievements of the English
judiciary during the almost 140 years or so, an achievement which produced an effective
private international law of contracts, was recognized and followed in practically the whole
world and has not at any time or anywhere led to dissatisfaction or to a demand for reform."
The Proper Law of the Contract-an Obituary, 107 L. Q. REV. 353, 353 (1991). That might,
however, be an overly pessimistic view; it might be argued that the tools developed by the
common law to help ascertain the applicable or proper law of the contract are, to a large
extent, also used by the Rome Convention. In the case of an express choice of law clause,
the Rome Convention is not substantially dissimilar to the common law's emphasis on party
autonomy. As for the applicable law in the absence of choice, the Rome Convention differs
from the common law by providing presumptions to be used. See Rome Convention, supra
note 4, art. 4(2). But the foundation for those presumptions is the same-that the aim of the
presumptions is to ascertain which country has the closest and real connection with the
contract. Indeed, where the presumptions are inapplicable, Article 4(5) requires the court to
consider all the circumstances to establish which country has a real connection which is the
closest to the contract. Id. art. 4(5). That is not dissimilar to the common law's proper law
doctrine. See In re United Rys. of the Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd., [1960] 2 W.L.R.
969; The Assunzione, [1954] 2 W.L.R. 234. As McClean said in this context, "in other
words, the primacy of the test of closest connection is re-asserted. The result may well be
that, at least in courts such as those of England which are used to a flexible test, the
presumptions will be resorted to only in 'tie-break' situations, and will have little importance
in most cases." JOHN DAVID MCCLEAN, MORRIS: THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 263 (J.H.C. Morris
ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1993). For examples of cases which apply the Rome Convention test,
see Apple Corps v. Apple Computers, [2004] EWHC (Ch) 768, [44]-[68] (Eng.); Armstrong
Int'l v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., [2003] All E.R. (D) 195 (Eng.); Marconi Commc'ns Int'l
Ltd. v. PT Pan Indon. Bank Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Comm) 129, [18]-[31] (Eng.); Definitely
Maybe (Touring) Ltd. v. Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1745,
[5]-[15] (Comm) (Eng.) (explaining how the Article 4(5) can displace the presumptions in
Article 4(2) in limited circumstances).
Be that as it may, the romanticism of English conflict of laws has finally yielded to written
law and with that, one might wonder what Professor Cheshire might make of all these E.U.-
induced changes. Professor Cheshire wrote in 1935 that:
Of all the departments of English law, Private International Law offers the freest
scope to the mere jurist .... It is not overloaded with detailed rules; it has been
only lightly touched by the paralyzing hand of the Parliamentary draftsman; it is
perhaps the one considerable department in which the formation of a coherent
body of law is in course of process; it is, at the moment, fluid not static, elusive not
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Convention, applies in England and Wales to all contracts made after April
1, 1991. If Islamic law cannot operate as the applicable law of the contract,
what are the legal implications under the Convention for a choice of foreign
or English law where the contract has a connection with a country where
Islamic principles are applied?
II. THE FACTS OF SHAMIL BANK
The claimant bank had applied for summary judgment against the
defendants. The basis of the claim was that the defendants, Beximco, and
others, had failed to honor their obligations under a financing agreement
made with the bank. The agreement might be generally described as a
"Morabaha" agreement, which under Islamic law required that the bank, as
seller, to acquire possession of the goods. In turn, the bank would sell the
goods to the defendants who would take delivery and make installment
payments with the addition of a pre-agreed profit.7  The contract was
essentially a sale between the defendants and the primary sellers, with the
bank acting as a financer. Because the imposition of interest, riba, is
prohibited under Islamic law, the bank needed to step in as a secondary
buyer who would pay for the goods and then resell them to the defendants
at a profit.8  The agreement stated that "subject to the principles of the
Glorious Sharia, this Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of England."
The use of such clauses is not a rare occurrence. Many Islamic
financial institutions have a significant presence in the City of London or
elsewhere in the European Union or the United States and have full access
to international lawyers in those jurisdictions. They see no commercial
imprudence in choosing these jurisdictions for litigation purposes. Also, as
all parties to a contract are not necessarily Islamic, 9 Islamic financing
institutions and traders are adroit to see that international parties to a
contract might perceive an English jurisdiction clause as particularly
advantageous for the purposes of commercial certainty.
The Shamil Bank defendants' argued that, because of the governing
law clause, the agreements were only enforceable if they were valid in the
obvious; it repels any tendency to dogmatism; and above all, the possible
permutations of the questions that it raises are so numerous that the diligent
investigator can seldom rest content with the solution that he proposes.
G.C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW vii (193 5).
7 See supra note 2 (explaining basic background information on Islamic banking and
providing general information on sources for further study).
8 Shamil Bank of Bahr. EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [44].
9 A syndicated financing arrangement is one example of a contract that may have both
Islamic and non-Islamic parties.
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eyes of both English and Sharia law.'0 The defendants alleged that certain
parts of the contract were contrary to Sharia law because they were in fact
disguised loans requiring the payment of interest, thus rendering the entire
contract invalid." If the agreement was invalid for this reason, both the
debtors and guarantors would be discharged. In the alternative, the
defendants argued that the guarantees had been entered into on the basis of
a common mistake as to the validity of the agreements under Sharia law
and were therefore of no effect.'
2
The trial judge held that English law was the governing law because
there could not be two separate systems of law governing the contract.'
3
The trial judge also held that the parties had not chosen Sharia law as the
governing law because as a set of religious principles, Sharia law was not
the law of a country, and therefore the parties could not have intended the
secular English court to resolve matters of religious controversy.14
III. THE ROME CONVENTION: NO TWO COMPETING APPLICABLE
LAWS
According to the Convention, the first step in determining the
applicable contract law is to determine if the parties agreed to a choice of
governing law. Party autonomy is the cornerstone of the Convention.
Article 3 provides:
(1) A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.
The choice must be express or demonstrated with reasonable
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the
case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the
whole or a part of the contract.
10 Shamil Bank, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [27].
11 Id.
12 The focus of this article will be on the issue of incorporation of Sharia principles, and
not on English law rules on common mistakes. On the issue of mistake, however, Lord
Steyn of the Court of Appeal held that a common mistake as to the legal consequences of the
Morabaha agreements would not qualify as a mistake apt to give rise to a defense because
the mistake was not one such as to "render the subject matter of the contract essentially and
radically different from the subject matter which the parties believed to exist." Assoc.
Japanese Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Credit du Nord SA, [1989] 1 W.L.R 255, 268. More generally,
mutual mistake has been defined as rendering "the thing [contracted for] essentially different
from the thing [that] it was believed to be." Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v. Tsavliris Salvage
Int'l, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1407, [47] (quoting Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd., [1932] A.C. 161,
218 (H.C.) (opinion of Lord Atkin)). For a commentary on Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v.
Tsavliris Salvage Int'l, see D.R. Thomas, Contract of Hire in Aid of Salvage-Common
Mistake, 9 J. INT'L MAR. L. 25 (2003).
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(2) The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law
other than that which previously governed it, whether as a result of
an earlier choice under this Article or of other provisions of this
Convention. Any variation by the parties of the law to be applied
made after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice its
formal validity under Article 915 or adversely affect the rights of
third parties. 16
Although Article 3(1) does not specifically refer to the law of a
specified country, other Articles of the Convention demonstrate that Article
3(1) should be interpreted as choice of law of a definable legal system of a
state. For example, Article 2 states that any law specified by the
Convention would be applied whether or not it is the law of a Contracting
State.17 Additionally, Article 3(3) states that parties' choice of a foreign
law "shall not, where all the other elements relevant to the situation at the
time of the choice are connected with one country only, prejudice the
application of rules of the law of that country which cannot be derogated
from by contract. 18  Such rules are generally known as "mandatory
rules."1  This provision of the Convention anticipates the choice of the law
of a foreign country.2 0  Furthermore, Article 4 provides that where the
15 Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 9 (addressing the rules of formal validity for the
contract). The article provides that a contract is formally valid if it satisfies the formal
requirements of the applicable law or of the law of the country where it is concluded. Id. art.
9(1). Where the contract is concluded between persons who are in different countries, the
contract is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the applicable law or of the
law of one of those countries. Id. art. 9(2). Where the contract is concluded by an agent, the
country in which the agent acts is the relevant country for the purposes of subsections 1 and
2 of Article 9. Id. art. 9(3).
16 Id. art. 3(l)-(2). An explanatory report on the Convention (the "Giuliano-Lagarde
Report") states that "[iun certain legal systems, a third party may have acquired rights in
consequence of a contract concluded between two other persons. These rights cannot be
affected by a subsequent change in the choice of the applicable law." Report on the
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (C282) 18
(prepared by Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde) [hereinafter Giuliano-Lagarde Report],
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31980Y1031
(01):EN:NOT.
17 Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. The Rome Convention is open to signing only
by members of the Europen Union. Id art. 28. Hence, a Contracting State in Article 2 is
defined as an E.U. member state which is a signatory of the Convention. Id. art. 2. Courts
may consult the Giuliano-Lagarde Report for guidance when interpreting the Rome
Convention. Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, c. 36, § 3(3)(a) (U.K.).
18 Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(3) (emphasis added). This section appears to be
of limited applicability because it is generally improbable in an international contracting
situation that all of the relevant elements associated with the choice of law would be
connected with only one country.
19 Id.
20 See LAWRENCE COLLINS, 2 DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1223
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parties had not made an express selection, the contract shall be presumed to
be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely
connected.2' This implies that the Convention excludes non-country
specific sets of rules, such as the lex mercatoria, international human rights,
international law or Sharia law, as possible sources of foreign law.
The 1972 draft of the Convention, which provided that the Convention
would only apply "in situations of an international character,, 22 is early
evidence of the view that the Convention should govern conflicts between
the laws of countries, not systems. This limitation was subsequently
rejected because of interpretative problems it was likely to cause.23  A
clearer statement of the scope of the Convention re-appeared in Article 1(1),
which states: "the rules of the Convention shall apply to contractual
obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different
countries. 24 Article 19(1) suggests that "country" includes any territorial
unit, whether it is a single state or a mere unit of a larger state, which has its
own rules of law in respect of contractual obligations. 25  Therefore, the
legislative history and text of Article 1(1) supports the proposition that the
notion of applicable law is one associated with countries. Therefore, the
general scheme of the Convention is that the reference point for the choice
(Butterworths ed., 1999); ADRIAN BRIGGS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (2002).
21 Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 4. There are a number of aids provided for by the
Convention on how the country with which the contract has the closest connection might be
presumed, for example:
[lI]t shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the country
where the party who is to effect the performance which is characteristic of the
contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or in
the case of a body corporate or unincorporate, its central administration. However,
if the contract is entered into in the course of that party's trade or profession, that
country shall be the country in which the principal place of business is situated or,
where under the terms of the contract the performance is to be effected through a
place of business other than the principal place of business, the country in which
that other place of business is situated.
Id. art. 4(2).
22 European Economic Community, Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations, 1972 (now withdrawn), reprinted in 21 AM. J.
COMP. L. 587 (1973).
23 See Lawrence Collins, Contractual Obligations: The EEC Preliminary Draft
Convention on Private Int'l Law, 25 INT. COMP. LAW. Q. 35, 39 (1976); P.M. NORTH & J.J.
FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 544 (1999); Ole Lando,
The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable To Contractual Obligations, 24 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 159 (1987); RICHARD PLENDER, THE EUROPEAN CONTRACTS CONVENTION 3.01-
3.03, 3.11-3.18 (Butterworths ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1992).
24 Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(1).
25 Id. art. 19.
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of law, whether express or presumed, should be a country.
If the Rome Convention restricts contractual choice of law provisions
to selection of the law of a particular country, it follows that, as a matter of
contract law, the requirements for legal certainty26 would not generally
permit a contract to be subject to two applicable laws.27 In other words, a
flexible choice of law clause, which permits a party to pick one out of two
or more possible applicable laws, would fail for want of certainty.28 Unlike
a flexible choice of forum clause which may be enforceable depending on
its clarity, a flexible choice of law could not be enforced because a contract
must define the governing law right at its inception. The defined governing
law gives life to the contract. The forum clause, on the other hand, merely
prescribes the place where that contract might be litigated; it does not give
succor to the contract like the governing law.
This single applicable law restriction traces its roots to common law,29
but there is no indication that the Rome Convention diverges from the
common law on this point.
Common law itself has always been institutionally distinctive. 30  A
common law judge could not apply principles of equitable law until 1876.31
This institutional distinctiveness supports a conflicts rule that prohibits
selective application of two competing proper laws.32
26 The same would also apply because of the requirements for commercial certainty.
27 See generally Astro Venturoso Compania Naviera v. Hellenic Shipyards S.A., [1983] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 12; Armar Shipping Co. v. Caisse Alg~rienne, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 207; Dubai
Elec. Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 380; Cantieri
Navali Riuniti SpA v. Omne Justitia NV, [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 428, E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours v. Agnew, [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 585. See Star Shipping AG v. China Nat'l
Foreign Trade Transp. Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 445 (explaining an implied floating
choice of law).
28 Examples of flexible choice of law clauses might include: "Chinese law or English law
at the defendant's option" or "Spanish law or English law at the Bank's option."
29 Shipping AG v. China Nat'l Foreign Trade Transp. Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 445,
449.
30 A.W.B SIMPSON, INVITATION TO LAW 81 (1991).
31 See generally Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66 (Eng.); see
also Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 9 Vict. c. 77 (Eng.).
32 The common law has always been flexible enough when transplanted into a colonized
environment to admit the application of personal laws and customs distinctive to the local
populations. Courts of Judicature in the colonies, from India to the Straits Settlements, were
empowered and exhorted to exercise all the jurisdiction of the English courts of law and
chancery "as far as circumstances [would] admit." Saik v. Drashid, [1946] 1 Malayan L.J.
147, 152 (App. Ct. Sept. 13, 1941). With respect to personal laws, Straits Settlements
Charter of 1855 allowed the courts of judicature to exercise jurisdiction as an ecclesiastical
court "so far as the several religions, manners and customs of the inhabitants will admit."
ROLAND BRADDELL, BRADDELL'S LAW OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS 17 (3rd ed. 1982);
Ying v. Chan [1933] 2 Malayan L.J. 301, 304 (Civ. Ct. Selangor July 27, 1933) (quoting
same); Abdullah v. Palamai [1935] 1 Malayan L.J. 147 (Civ. Ct. Singapore Apr. 13, 1935)
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The proposition that a contract cannot be governed by two competing
applicable laws is consistent with the doctrine of severance 33 described in
Article 3(1) of the Convention. Article 3(1) states that the parties may
select the law applicable to a subset of the contract or to the entire
contract.3 a The doctrine of severance does not allow a single contractual
provision to be subject to two competing laws. Rather, each distinct and
severable provision of the contract may be subject to a different set of
applicable laws, within the bounds that the resulting contract is not
uncertain or absurd. Indeed, the Giuliano-Lagarde Report35 anticipates the
choice of law problems that severance may cause, and makes it clear that
severance should be employed "as seldom as possible" and only "for a part
of a contract which is independent and separable, in terms of the contract




(quoting same); Mustan v. Rex [1946] 1 Malayan L.J. 36, 38 (App. Ct. Nov. 3, 1941) (citing
same). For an application of the maxim, see e.g., Ong Cheng Neo v. Yeap Cheah Neo
(1874-75) L.R. 6 P.C. 381, 393-94 (P.C. 1875) (appeal taken from Sup. Ct. of Straits
Settlement). In contrast, in the pre-Empire days, the position was less pragmatic and a
distinction was made between Christian and non-Christian territories. Lord Coke, for
example, said in Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, [18a] (1608) reprinted in 77 ENGLISH
REPORTS 377, 398 (1932): "If a King conquers a Christian kingdom ... he may at his
pleasure alter the laws of the kingdom, but until he [does] so, the ancient laws ... remain.
But if a Christian king should conquer the kingdom of an infidel, and bring them under his
subjugation, [then] ipso facto, the laws of the infidels are abrogated, for that they are not
only against Christianity but against the law of God and of nature, contained in the
Decalogue .... That theory was subsequently expunged by Lord Mansfield, a mercantile
court judge, in Campbell v. Hall, Lofft. 655, 716 (1774) reprinted in 98 ENGLISH REPORTS
848 (1932): "Don't quote the distinction [between Christians and non-Christians] for the
honour of my Lord Coke." As David Pearl wrote: "By the end of the colonial era,
indigenous law was recognized as law proper by all the colonial powers, with the exception
of Germany, and as a result, internal conflict of law rules developed to regulate the legal
relations of the autochthonous population and the colonials, and of the various sectors of the
autochthonous population." DAVID PEARL, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS 26 (1981).
33 On the doctrine of severance or d6pegage as applied in the Rome Convention, see
generally James Young, An EEC Choice of Law Code for Contracts, 9(11) INT'L BANKING L.
445, 447 (1991); Adrian J. Beltrami, Contracts (Applicable Law) Bill, 1(2) INT'L CO. & COM.
L. REV. C-34 (1990).
34 Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(1).
35 Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 16, at 23.
36 Id. An example of a contract containing an index-linking clause is where the index
linking clause might be subject to an applicable law different from what applies to the rest of
the contract. However, it is thought that such a severance would not cause problems of
certainty and is therefore enforceable under Article 3(1). Id. at 17.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SHAMIL BANK: A MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION
37
Given the fact that English law prohibits two competing applicable
laws of the contract, and the Rome Convention's choice of law restriction to
the laws of a country, the claimant bank could not argue that Sharia law
was the applicable law of the contract in question. The defendants
submitted that the governing law clause demonstrated that the parties had
intended that an English court should also be cognizant of the principles of
Islamic law while applying English law as the applicable law of the
contract. In other words, the defendants asserted that it was not repugnant
to the conflicts rule to read into the contract a condition precedent that the
contract was only enforceable insofar as it is consistent with the principles
of Sharia, whose principles amount to legal rules ascertainable and
applicable by an English court.
The lower court addressed the issue of whether the governing law
clause manifested an intention by the parties to require an English court to
adopt Islamic legal principles when applying English law.3" The lower
court held that there was too much uncertainty in the clause to permit such a
construction because the "Glorious Sharia," referred to by the clause,
embodied both legal and religious principles, and therefore, the parties
could not have intended to expect an English court to apply a set of
religious principles whose content is, in many respects, controversial.39
On appeal, the defendant-appellants argued that asking an English
court to apply English law in harmony with Sharia law when interpreting a
contract was neither an unusual request, nor was it outside of the
capabilities of the court.40 Historically, English courts have been able to
apply English law alongside a body of codified non-country specific legal
rules, such as the Warsaw Convention or the Hague Rules, where there is an
incorporation clause such as a paramount clause. 41  The defendant-
appellants argued that the governing clause in the contract in the instant
42case could be analogized to a paramount clause in a carriage contract.The claimant bank had held itself out as an Islamic bank conducting Islamic
37 See C. Debattista, Legislative Techniques in International Trade: Madness or Method,
2002 J. Bus. L. 626 (2002) (critiquing approaches used by English courts in construing
international commercial contracts).
38 Shamil Bank ofBahr. EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd, [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2118, [36].
39 Shamil Bank of Bahr. EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [41];
Shamil Bank, [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2118, [36].
40 Shamil Bank, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [44].
41 See Nea Agrex S.A. v. Baltic Shipping Co., [1976] 1 Q.B. 933, 934 (holding that "the
incorporation of the paramount clause into the charter party meant that all the accepted
Hague Rules... were brought into the charterparty.") With that ruling, the Court of Appeal
overruled the lower court's finding that a paramount clause was ineffective in incorporating
the Hague Rules into a charterparty. Id. at 946.
42 Shamil Bank, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [43].
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banking business, and therefore, it was clear that the parties intended to
apply relevant Islamic principles to the contract.
43
Additionally, the defendant-appellants argued that the lower court's
holding was flawed because of its emphasis on the uncertainties and
controversies generally surrounding Sharia law.44 The defendant-appellants
argued that the court is entitled to seek expert evidence on the specific
provisions of the legal corpus applicable to the contract in question.45
Therefore, the lower court's concern of being ill-equipped to apply Sharia
law was overstated.
Finally, the defendant-appellants argued that the lower court erred in
holding that the Sharia principles relevant to the contract were
controversial.4 6  While the defendant-appellants conceded that there are
some controversial aspects of Sharia law as applied to contracts, Sharia law
as applied to the contract in question did not present a controversy.4 7 The
appellants argued that the proscription of riba and the essentials of a valid
Morabaha agreement were not controversial, and as such, the lower court
should have applied the principles in interpreting the contract.48
A. Intent of the Contracting Parties
The Court of Appeal applied principles of contract construction to
analyze the defendant-appellant's arguments. The starting point was Lord
Wilberforce's dictum in Reardon Smith Line Limited. v. Yngvar Hansen-
Tangen:
In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should
know the commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn
presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the
background the context, the market in which the parties are
operating. 49
After analyzing the transaction, the Court of Appeal viewed the loan
41 Id. [6]-[9], [43].
44 Id. [45].
45 Id. (citing Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bah.) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems NV, 2001 Folio
1226, slip. op. at 10-12 (EWHC (Comm) Feb. 13, 2002), available at 2002 WL 346969 (no
pagination available); also available at http://www.lawtel.com (original court transcript with
page numbers)); but see Al-Bassam v. A1-Bassam, [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2281, rev'd on other
grounds, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 857 (noting that the court was quite prepared, upon evidence
by expert witnesses, to inquire into the intricacies of Islamic law) and Glencore Int'l AG v.
Metro Trading Int'l Inc, [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 284 (same).
46 Shamil Bank of Bahr.EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [45].
47 Id.
48 id.
41 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989, 995-96 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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agreements as interest bearing transactions couched and disguised in
Morabaha terms,50 because the defendants intended for the bank to
contribute to their working capital, and the goods specified in the
agreements were merely a vehicle to swell the working capital. 5' The court
noted that:
[N]either side was under any illusion as to the commercial realities
of the transactions, namely the provision by the Bank of working
capital on terms providing for long term repayment, and both were
content 'to dress the loan transactions up as Morabaha sales...',
whilst taking no interest in whether the proper formalities of such a
sale or lease were actually complied with ....
The Court of Appeal naturally leaned towards a contract construction
which serves the commercial objective of the contract rather than one which
defeats it. The commercial objective was the provision of capital on
"conventional" terms couched in Islamic compliant language. The court
found the contractual references to Sharia were less than genuine and were
instead part of a marketing and public relations enterprise. While the court
was careful not to allude to the defendant-appellants' honor or good faith, it
can be inferred that the court was unwilling to carry on the fagade and give
force to a venture where reliance on Islamic principles was sought for less
than honorable reasons. The Court of Appeal took a sound approach to the
case, ascertaining the commercial objective of the agreement and then
applying a construction, as long as it is not absurd, which promotes that
objective.
Although the appellants in Shamil Bank conceded that the contracts in
question were actually conventional interest bearing agreements disguised
as Morabaha instruments, the case raises the issue of how an English court
might analyze a contract when a Morabaha instrument is genuinely
intended. Making the distinction between a genuine Morabaha instrument
and a standard loan dressed up as a Morabaha is neither easy nor practical.
In Shamil Bank, the court found that prior to the lawsuit, the defendant-
appellants had no reservations about the agreement on religious grounds or
conflicts with Sharia law. As previously noted, the Court of Appeal
emphasized the fact that both parties to the contract had "no interest in
whether the proper formalities of such a sale or lease were actually
50 Shamil Bank, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [19]-[26]. There were also ancillary contracts
in the transaction which took the form of yarah leases in the case but for our purposes and
convenience, it is sufficient that the contract was found to have been dressed as Islamic
compliant transactions. Id. [20].
"' Id. [28].
52 Id. [47] (emphasis added).
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complied with."53 On that basis, the Court of Appeal concluded that the
transaction was therefore not a genuine Morabaha instrument but a
standard loan transaction disguised as a Morabaha agreement. The
problem with this approach is that the Court of Appeal, by insisting on a
genuine link between the subject matter and the financing institution, had
made its own assessment as to what constitutes a genuine Morabaha
instrument without reference to Islamic law and practice. Therein lies the
essence of the issue-the Morabaha instrument is intended to be a
substitute for or an alternative to "conventional" financing, but the Court of
Appeal ruling in Shamil Bank may have improperly limited the flexibility of
the Morabaha instruments as a form of financing by requiring the financing
bank to have a real and substantive link with the subject matter. The Court
of Appeal holding in Shamil Bank has clearly defined a Morabaha as a sale
transaction, and not as a financing arrangement. The court in Shamil Bank
was clearly swayed by the fact that the purpose of the Morabaha
arrangement was to provide working capital for the defendants, not to
finance the purchase of goods. Nevertheless, the court's emphasis on
establishing a genuine link between the Morabaha and the goods in order to
determine the commercial object of the Morabaha makes the use of such
Islamic financing arrangements less clear not only in the context of choice
of law but also in a general commercial or contractual context.
B. Viability of Morabaha Agreements as Financing Instruments
The court's analysis in Shamil Bank might be juxtaposed against the
current debate on the viability of the Morabaha as a form of Islamic
financing. Some Islamic scholars take the view that the Morabaha mimics
the interest-bearing convention financing, because the fixed-profit margin is
frequently adjusted based on the interest rate of a particular country (such as
the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate, "LIBOR") and is in actuality a simple
sale on cost-plus basis.54 Scholar and retired Justice Mufti Muhammad
Taqi Usmani noted the closeness of Morabaha to interest-based financing,
stating that "murabaha is a border-line transaction and a slight departure
from the prescribed procedure makes it step on the prohibited area of
interest-based financing. Therefore, this transaction must be carried out
with due diligence and no requirement of Shari'ah should be taken
lightly., 55 Other well-respected commentators have criticized Morabaha
arrangements as mere window dressing for conventional interest-bearing
53 id.
54 See MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 151 (1988);
Mahmoud EI-Gamal, Interest and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance,
27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 108, 127 (2003).
55 EI-Gamal, supra note 54, at 128 (citing MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION
TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 152 (1988)).
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financing. 56 Indeed, there is evidence of some Islamic banks moving away
from the Morabaha arrangement to iarah leasing. 57 In ijarah, the fixed
rate of return is designated as rental payment for the underlying asset. 58
While the asset must have a legitimate usufruct, (in other words, the goods
must be tangible), this requirement is easily satisfied by movable and
immovable property assets. The iarah leasing arrangements are not
entirely free of characteristics resembling interest-bearing financing,
because even in the iarah, the fixed rental return is frequently tied to the
interest rate of a particular country such as LIBOR.59  If commentators
cannot agree on whether Morabaha arrangements and ijarah leasing are
truly something other than interest-bearing financing, it is no wonder why
English courts evaluating these contracts have difficulty distinguishing
between "window dressing" and the expression of a genuine Islamic
compliant instrument.
C. Incorporation Principles and Islamic Law
The Court of Appeal in Shamil Bank also addressed the issue of
whether an analogy might be drawn from paramount clauses in
transport/carriage contracts. The court held that:
The doctrine of incorporation can only sensibly operate where the
parties have by the terms of their contract sufficiently identified
specific 'black letter' provisions of a foreign law or an international
code or set of rules apt to be incorporated as terms of the relevant
contract such as a particular article or articles of the French Civil
Code or the Hague Rules.
60
The Court of Appeal held that general reference to the "Glorious
Sharia" in the contract was not sufficient to incorporate it as "terms of the
relevant contract.",61 The Court of Appeal continued by explaining that
"[t]he general reference to principles of Sharia afford no reference to, or
56 Id.
57 The majority of the financing instruments used are still in the Morabaha form, but
there is evidence that some banks are developing other forms of financing, including the
iarah and the musharakah. Id. Indeed, regret has been expressed that too many market
operators are too conservative in not venturing beyond the Morabaha. See Rafi-uddin
Shikoh, Corporate Islamic Finance: The Good News and the Bad News, DINAR STANDARD,
July 20, 2005, http://dinarstandard.com/finance/corporatelF071505.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2006).
58 See generally Taylor, supra note 2, at 397.
59 El-Gamal, supra note 54, at 128.
60 Shamil Bank of Bahr. EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [51]
(emphasis in original).
61 Id.
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identification of, those aspects of Sharia law which are intended to be
incorporated into the contract, let alone the terms in which they are
framed.
62
The Court of Appeal, in addressing the argument that to not give legal
effect to the contractual reference to Sharia was to treat the words as mere
surplusage, affirmed the lower court's view that the clause was intended no
more than:
to reflect the Islamic religious principles according to which the
Bank holds itself out as doing business rather than a system of law
intended to 'trump' the application of English law as the law to be
applied in ascertaining the liability of the parties under the terms of
the agreement.
63
It is difficult to reconcile the Court of Appeal's holding on this issue with
the precise wording of the clause. A literal interpretation should be
disregarded where the result is contrary to established legal precept (for
example, an interpretation of the clause as establishing two competing
applicable laws for interpreting the contract). However, it is unlikely that
the holding in Shamil Bank could be extended to a more general proposition
that contractual references to "Glorious Sharia" are merely assertions of a
business's quality or values. In Shamil Bank, the facts do not completely
rule out the possibility that the parties may have intended for the Sharia to
be given some regard when interpreting the contract. 64 Despite the Court of
Appeal holding to the contrary, a Morabaha is generally recognized as
more than a conventional sale agreement notwithstanding the controversy
as to its effectiveness as a financing instrument compliant with Islamic
law.65 The Court of Appeal's restriction of the legitimate scope of the
Morabaha may have influenced its view on the intent of the parties in
referencing the "Glorious Sharia." However, even if the Court of Appeal in
Shamil Bank resolved the issues of intent in favor of the appellant-
defendant, the uncertainty surrounding scope and content of Sharia law was




64 See id. [6]-[9] (explaining that given that the agreement, and the performance thereof,
had been subjected to the approval of the bank's religious supervisory board and clear
references to Islamic principles by the board in the certificate of compliance issued). Indeed,
the Court noted that "[u]ntil their defenses were filed in this action, the [appellants] had
never given any indication to the bank that they were dissatisfied on religious grounds with
the arrangements agreed between the parties or that they sought to challenge them on the
grounds that they did not comply with the principles of Sharia." Id. [10].
65 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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V. CONTRACTUAL FOREIGN ILLEGALITY DEFENSES WHERE
THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE RECOGNIZES ISLAMIC
PRINCIPLES
If a contract governed by English law requires performance in a
country which recognizes Islamic principles, it is inevitable that issues of
foreign illegality would arise. Foreign illegality defenses can be organized
into two subcategories-substantive and procedural.
A. Applying a Foreign Illegality Defense on Substantive Grounds
In Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Limited v.
Symphony Gems N. V & Ors. ,6 the High Court was asked to enforce
payment of liquidated damages pursuant to a contract expressed to be a
Morabaha agreement. The examination of a financial transaction structured
in Islamic principles was a matter of first impression for English courts.
Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf ("IIC") had entered into a
Morabaha financing agreement with Symphony Gems ("Symphony") under
which IIC was to provide a revolving purchase and sale facility to enable
Symphony to buy precious diamonds.6? Under the agreement, Symphony,
as a buyer, would identify and select the stones, which IIC would then
purchase and immediately resell to Symphony at a pre-agreed profit
68thmargin. Under the contract, Symphony accepted responsibility for
selecting gem suppliers and for payment to the suppliers regardless of any
"defect, deficiency or any loss or any other breach" of a sale contract
between a supplier and IIC. 69 Symphony was also bound by the contract to
pay IIC the full amount of the original price regardless of whether title or
possession had actually passed to Symphony or IIC. 70 Symphony's rights
were restricted by two independent provisions. Under the contract, IIC was
not liable to Symphony for the condition or quantity of the goods and their
compliance with whatever expectations or arrangements Symphony might
have with the gem supplier. Although risk was to be assumed by IIC as
long as it held title to the goods, it expressly disclaimed liability for any
damage, loss or delay caused in transit. The contract was expressed to be
governed by English law and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
English courts.
66 Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems NV, 2001 Folio 1226,
slip. op. (EWHC (Comm) Feb. 13, 2002), available at 2002 WL 346969 (no pagination
available); also available at http://www.lawtel.com (original court transcript with page
numbers).
67 Id. at 1-2, 13.
68 Id. at 12-15.
69 Id. at 4-6.
70 Id. at 5-6.
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A supplier, Precious (HK) Ltd., was subsequently selected by
Symphony and IIC made full payment to Precious. Symphony, however,
refused to pay IIC, asserting that the goods had not been delivered. 7  The
court rejected Symphony's defense, holding that upon the proper
construction of the contract, delivery was not a pre-condition to payment.72
Symphony also argued that the contract was unenforceable because part of
the transaction took place under the laws of Saudi Arabia, where the
contract would have been prohibited. Although the contract was governed
by English law, Symphony argued that the English court should not enforce
the contract because of its illegality in Saudi Arabia.
Symphony's unenforceability argument did not rely directly on Sharia
principles. Instead, the defendants sought to rely on the English court's
general disinclination to enforce a contract which is unlawful under some
foreign law, which in this case was Saudi Arabian law that codifies Sharia
principles.73 This disinclination, though expressed as being based on
international judicial comity, is not an inflexible rule.74 A good measure of
judicial discretion is normally injected into the decision-making process.
An English court will always look at the substance of the illegality in
question and what English public policy dictates.75 The court in Lemenda
Trading Co. Ltd. v. African Middle East Petroleum Co. noted:
The English courts should not enforce an English law contract which
fails to be performed abroad where: (i) it relates to an adventure
which is contrary to a head of English public policy which is
founded on general principles of morality, and (ii) the same public
policy applies to the country of performance so that the agreement
would not be enforceable under the law of that country.
76
In such a situation international comity combines with English
domestic public policy to militate against enforcement.77 Of the two
factors, English domestic public policy emerges as the dominant force that
71 Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems NV, 2001 Folio 1226,
slip. op. at 1-2 (EWHC (Comm) Feb. 13, 2002), available at 2002 WL 346969 (no
pagination available); also available at http://www.lawtel.com (original court transcript with
page numbers).72 Id. at 23.
73 Id. at 24-25; see also Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd., [1958] A.C. 301 (H.L.)
(explaining that English courts will not enforce contracts when the enforcement thereof
involves acts performed in a foreign country and which are illegal in that country).
74 Mahonia Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, [2003] EWHC (Comm) 1927, [16]-[17]
(internal citations omitted).
75 See generally CHITTY ON CONTRACTS § 16-027, at 787-88 (A.G. Guest ed., 27th ed.
1994).
76 [1988] Q.B. 448, at 461.
77 Id.
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determines if enforcement will occur.
The Commercial Court rejected Symphony's argument, stating that
part of the transaction claimed by Symphony to have some connection with
Saudi Arabia was so minor that the principle of foreign illegality could not
justifiably be invoked.78 The court found that the agreement did not call for
any performance by the parties in Saudi Arabia.79 The fact that IIC was
based in Saudi Arabia and that the contract offers and acceptances were
faxed to and from IIC in Saudi Arabia was insufficient to assert the
principle of foreign illegality. Moreover, Symphony was a Belgian
company and the only non-payment obligations to be performed under the
agreement were to be performed by Symphony in Belgium.
The foreign law argument in Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf
failed because there was no real nexus between the performance of the
contract in question and the country where the contract would have been
illegal. However, in other factual circumstances, the principle of foreign
illegality may provide an alternative defense to breach of contract, when a
choice of law or incorporation defense is likely to fail because of poor
contract drafting. The success of a foreign illegality defense depends on
whether the foreign illegality coincides with English public policy. In
Mahonia Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,8° in dismissing a preliminary
application strike out defense, the Commercial Court held that as a matter
of law, a letter of credit issued to support an underlying contract that was
unlawful under U.S. law could not be enforced. 81 The letter of credit in
question was required to set up a cosmetic scheme to pass off certain
accounts as healthy, in violation of securities law in the United States.
Thus, despite the principle of autonomy,82 the court held that a letter of
credit would be unenforceable if tainted by foreign illegality. Although the
underlying contract was legal in England, an English court would not, in
principle, support the commission of an offense abroad in the place of
78 Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems NV, 2001 Folio 1226,
slip. op. at 25-26 (EWHC (Comm) Feb. 13, 2002), available at 2002 WL 346969 (no
pagination available); also available at http://www.lawtel.com (original court transcript with
page numbers).
79 id.
80 [2003] EWHC (Comm) 1927, (2003) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 911; see JASON CHUAH, LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 492-93 (3d ed. 2005) (commenting on Mahonia).
"l Mahonia, [2003] EWHC (Comm) 1927, [24], [28]-[29]. The alleged purpose for
entering into the three swap transactions was to enable one party (Enron) to obtain a loan
without disclosing the loan to the SEC. The omission was allegedly contrary to United States
GAAP Financial Accounting Standard Board statement 133 and therefore, it would have
been against U.S. securities laws for Enron to fail to disclose the loan in filings with the
SEC. The conduct with intent to defraud could lead to criminal and civil liability under the
United States Securities Exchange Act. Id. [5].
82 Id. [39].




There are significant barriers to succeed on a defense of foreign
illegality. Based on the holding in Mahonia, an English court might be
expected to be hesitant to apply the principle of foreign illegality where the
illegality is a mere technical offense or one which finds little
correspondence or recognition in English public policy as inappropriate
conduct. This result is even more likely when the contract at issue is
explicitly expressed to be governed by English law. Furthermore, English
courts are not prepared to undertake a legal evaluation as to whether a
foreign law has actually been breached. However, much depends on the
weight of evidence. 84 The High Court held that evidence presented before
the court at trial was insufficient to determine whether an offense under the
United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and violation of the
relevant United States version of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP")) had been committed by the parties. 85 The court would not
therefore deny enforcement of the letter of credit which underpinned that
transaction. Although it might be argued that the court's unwillingness was
influenced to a large extent by the principle that the letter of credit is
autonomous, it is likely that the court erred on the side of non-enforcement
because the underlying conduct is prohibited in the United States and not
under English law.
An English court would be far more likely to find foreign illegality in
cases concerning contracts expressed to be governed by the foreign law, or
in cases concerning contracts presumed to be governed by a foreign law
according to the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 ("the Act").86
Articles 8 and 10 of the Rome Convention, as given effect to by the Act,
provide that a contract which is unenforceable under its applicable law
would also normally not be enforceable in England. 87 This outcome is
83 Id. [16].
84 Evidence of foreign illegality is controversial, especially when the illegality has merely
been alleged and not proved. An English court would rely heavily on expert testimony, and
would treat the proof of foreign illegality (or foreign law) as a question of fact, not of law.
Sussex Peerage, (1844) 11 Cl. & F. 85 (H.L.); Baron De Bode's Case, (1845) 8 Q.B. 208;
Nelson v. Bridport, (1845) [1843-1860] All E.R. Rep. 1032 (Rolls Court); Buerger v. N.Y.
Life Assurance Co., [1927] All E.R. Rep. 342 (K.B.). Substantial weight is also given to the
decisions of foreign courts as evidence of foreign law. Beatty v. Beatty, (1924) 1 K.B. 807;
Bankers & Shippers Liverpool Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., (1926) 24 Ll. L. Rep 85 (H.L.).
85 Mahonia Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, [2004] EWHC (Comm) 1938, [422]-[434]
(Eng.).
86 Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, c. 36 (U.K.).
87 Article 8(1) states: "The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a
contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this Convention if the
contract or term were valid." Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 8(1). Article 10(1) states:
The law applicable to a contract ... shall govern in particular:
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tempered by an element of judicial discretion. English courts have
consistently ruled that a finding of foreign illegality will not occur if the
foreign law is one which English law rejects on grounds of public policy or
substantial justice.88
B. Applying a Foreign Illegality Defense on Performance Grounds
Under Article 10(2) of the Convention, a court applying foreign law 89
is required to consider "the law of the country in which performance takes
place" when evaluating "the manner of performance and the steps to be
taken in the event of defective performance."90 Article 10(2) deals with the
situation where the law of the country where performance takes place is
different from the applicable law of the contract. How would an English
(a) interpretation;
(b) performance;
(c) within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by its procedural law,
the consequences of breach, including the assessment of damages in so far as
it is governed by rules of law;
(d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation
of actions;
(e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.
Id. art. 10(1).
88 See, e.g., Heriz v. Riera, (1840) 59 Eng. Rep. 896 (Ch.); MacKender v. Feldia A.G.
(1967) 2 Q.B. 590; In re Lord Cable, (1977) 1 W.L.R. (Ch.) (where the foreign law places on
one or both the parties an unfair discrimination). See also Royal Boskalis Westminster N.V.
v. Mountain, [1999] Q.B. 674; Kahler v. Midland Bank LD., [1950] A.C. 24 (H.L.) (where
there is a vitiating factor, not recognized by the foreign law, but deemed wholly damaging to
consent). The discretion of the court, however, would be narrowly applied. The approach is
encapsulated by Judge Cardozo:
We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong
because we deal with it otherwise at home .... The courts are not free to refuse to
enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of
expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals,
some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 201-02 (N.Y. 1918).
89 Article 10(2) of the Rome Convention does not explicitly mention foreign law.
However, if the applicable law is English (and not foreign), an English court would be bound
to apply English law (as internal law) and not the private international law of England (of
which the Rome Convention belongs). Additionally, Article 10(2) is read in conjunction with
Article 10(1) which refers to "the law applicable to a contract by virtue of Articles 3 to 6 and
12," and those provisions by and large refer to the selection or presumption of a foreign law.
Rome Convention, supra note 4, arts. 3, 6, 10, 12. Rome Convention, supra note 4, arts. 3,
6, 10, 12.
90 Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(2) (emphasis added).
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court apply Article 10(2) to a contract governed by a foreign law (not of a
country which has incorporated Islamic law) which requires payment to be
made in a country where the payment of interest is prohibited or is
limited?91
First, there is the issue of what is meant by "method and manner of
performance." At common law, a clear distinction was made between
obligations which were of the substance of the contract and obligations
which were merely matters relating to the method or manner of
performance. For example, in Mount Albert Borough Council v.
Australasian Temperance & General Mutual Life Assurance Society,
Limited,92 the New Zealand borough council had issued debentures charged
at borough rates to an insurance company in Victoria, Australia. The
interest rate on the debentures was five and two-thirds percent and payable
in Victoria. In 1931, during the Great Depression, the Victoria legislature
passed a statute reducing all mortgage rates to 5 percent. The court held
that the statute did not apply to the debentures because although Victoria
was the place of performance, New Zealand law was the proper law to
apply when determining the interest rate of the debentures.
93
Based on the reasoning in Mount Albert, it follows that the prohibition
of or limitation on the payment of riba, and the rule barring penalties or
fees for late performance,94 are not matters relating to the "method or
manner of performance" but are matters of performance itself. The
Giuliano-Lagarde Report offers some examples that illustrate the scope of
Convention Article 10(2), such as rules governing public holidays, how
91 In the United Arab Emirates, for example, Part 2 of the Commercial Code
(Commercial Obligations and Contracts) states in Article 76 that "[a] creditor shall have the
right to demand interest on a commercial loan in accordance with the rate stipulated in the
contract... not [to] exceed 12 per cent." THE LAW OF COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: ISSUING LAW: FEDERAL LAW No. 18 OF 1993, 46 (Dawoud Sudqi El
Alami trans., 1993). That said, the Dubai Court of Cassation, in Judgment No. 261/96, held
that a creditor was entitled to collect 15 per cent interest on a debt the payment of which had
been considerably delayed. RICHARD PRICE & ESSAM AL TIMIi, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
COURT OF CASSATION JUDGMENTS: 1989-1997 51-52 (1998). Such recognition of
commercial realities which clearly influenced the application of Islamic proscriptions is seen
in a number of Islamic legal systems. Indeed, many such countries (e.g., Pakistan, U.A.E.,
Morocco, Qatar, Kuwait, Egypt) have made a clear distinction between civil and commercial
matters, and have permitted to some extent foreign commercial and financial transactions to
be exempt from the proscription against riba and gharar. See H. S. Shaaban, Comment,
Commercial Transactions in the Middle East, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 157 (1999). Be
that as it may, that is not a certainty and the demarcation between foreign and domestic
performance of the contract is not always entirely clear.
92 [1938] A.C. 224 (H.L. 1937) (appeal taken from N.Z.).
93 Id. at 231.
94 See, e.g., THE QUR'AN 2:280 (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans., 2004) ("If the debtor is in
difficulty, then delay things until matters become easier for him.").
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goods are to be examined, and the steps to be taken to reject the delivery of
goods.95 These examples illustrate that the less important details of
performance are more likely to fall within the scope of Article 10(2).96 A
comparison with examples offered in support of Article 10(1) illustrates
what is not classified as a "method or manner of performance":
The diligence with which the obligation must be performed;
conditions relating to the place and time of performance; the extent
to which the obligation can be performed by a person other than the
party liable; the conditions as to performance of the obligation both
in general and in relation to categories of obligation (joint and
several obligations, alternative obligations, divisible and indivisible
obligations, pecuniary obligations); where performance consists of
the payment of a sum of money, the conditions relating to the
discharge of the debtor who has made the payment, the appropriation
of the payment, the receipt, etc.
97
The examples given in the Giuliano-Lagarde Report for Article 10(1)
explain the categories of what constitute "method or manner of
performance" are extremely narrow.
Despite the absence of European Court of Justice and Member State
case law defining the scope of Article 10(2), it does not appear that there is
a significant difference between the common law and the Convention on the
distinction between the substance of a contract and the method and manner
of contract performance.
When performance of a contract takes place in a country governed by
Islamic law, those laws will influence the analysis of contractual issues
concerning the manner of performance or the steps to be taken in the event
of defective performance. For example, application of Islamic law may
affect the extent to which pre-payments or rebates are permitted,98 or what
constitutes possession.99 The degree of influence of Islamic law in these
circumstances differs, depending on whether the Convention or common
law principles are applied. Under Article 10(2) of the Convention, the court
only needs to have regard for the law of the place of performance,100
whereas at common law an English court was required to apply the law of
the place of performance. 01 There is little guidance as to how discretion
95 Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 16, at 33.
96 NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 23, at 597.
97 Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 16, at 32-33.
98 See USMANI, supra note 54, at 60-62; WAHBAH AL-ZUHAYLI, FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 328 (Mahmoud el-Gamal trans., 2003).
99 See USMANI, supra note 54, at 38.
100 Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(2).
101 Adelaide Electric Supply Co. v. Prudential Assurance Co., [1934] A. C. 122, 133
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should be exercised under Convention Article 10(2). The only assistance
provided in the Giuliano-Lagarde Report is a brief exhortation that the court
should do justice between the parties. 0 2
An example of the common law doctrine of foreign'illegality is found
in Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar.103 In Ralli Brothers,
the court held a contract unenforceable where performance of that contract
was forbidden by the law at the place of performance. A carriage contract
expressed to be governed by English law provided for the payment of
freight on delivery of the cargo at Barcelona. The rate was set at £50 per
ton. After the date of the contract, but before the vessel's arrival, the
Spanish government imposed a ceiling limit on the payment of freight. It
decreed that it would be illegal to pay more than the equivalent of £10 per
ton. 0 4 The court dismissed the shipowner's claim for the difference of
freight, holding that the illegality under Spanish law should be
recognized.105 However, as the contract in Ralli Brothers was expressed to
be governed by English law, the "conflict" was between English law and
the law of the place of performance. In such a case, as English law is the
applicable law, the court is required to apply the internal law and not the
private international law of England. It is not in fact a private international
law issue. Instead, the issue in Ralli Brothers was one founded in the
common law doctrine of frustration of contracts. Article 10(2), on the other
hand, deals with the conflict between the applicable law of the contract and
the law of the place of performance, a matter of private international law.
The holding from Ralli Brothers is thus not directly applicable to a case
evaluated under Article 10(2).106 It remains to be seen whether the courts
will adopt the Ralli Brothers approach when applying Article 10(2).
There are two likely approaches that an English commercial court
might contemplate when faced with such a situation, where the place of
performance is in a foreign country governed by Islamic law. The first
approach is to determine whether the law of the place of performance
actually renders the manner of performance unlawful, and then rule
accordingly. The second approach avoids making such a decision by
construing the agreement in a manner to sidestep the issue,'0 7 or by abusing
(H.L.); see also Jacobs, Marcus, & Co. v. Credit Lyonnais, (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 589; Mount
Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance & Gen. Mut. Life Assurance Soc'y,
[1938] A.C. 224 (H.L.) (appeal taken from N.Z.).
102 Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 16, at 33.
103 [1920] 2 K.B. 287.
104 Id. at 290.
1' Id. at 297-98.
106 NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 23, at 602.
107 One way of construing the agreement (to sidestep the need to determine whether
manner of performance is lawful at the place of performance) is to find that the performance
could be carried out elsewhere. Another way is to find that the manner of performance is not
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the discretion allowed under Article 10(2) and stating that in the eyes of
English and the applicable law there was nothing unlawful about the
manner of performance. The latter approach raises the issue of how judicial
discretion should be exercised under Article 10(2). There are two possible
methods of applying judicial discretion in tension with one another. The
first method is to consider the parties' presumed intention, that is to say,
force of the contract. The second method is to apply the international
comity principle; in other words, consider the wider interstate relationship
and territorial interest of the state where performance is to take place. The
Giuliano-Lagarde Report's reference to "doting] justice between the
parties" places the emphasis on the first method. 
08
Therefore, the first duty of the court should be to give effect to the
agreement as understood by the applicable foreign law. The court should
then consider whether the manner of performance is contrary to the law of
the place of performance, by evaluating whether illegality and the likely
intervention of the country where performance takes place render
performance an impossibility. It should be noted that English courts
evaluating commercial cases may be inclined to save the contract at issue
rather than to strike it down if the circumstances permit.10 9
C. Judicial Treatment of Failed Foreign Law Arguments
In Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf, the court emphasized that
although the contract was governed by English law and interpreted under
English law, the contract did not comply with Islamic principles because
the required shurut (conditions for the essential validity of the contract)
were not present. 10 While the court's analysis on the compliance of the
what the objecting party claimed it to be.
108 Giuliano-Lagarde Report, supra note 16, at 33.
109 See, e.g., Boyd & Co. Ltd. v. Louca, [1973] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 209 (Com. Ct.) (Eng.)
(holding that a contract calling for "F.O.B. stowed good Danish port" was not too uncertain
to be enforced).
110 Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems NV, 2001 Folio
1226, slip. op. at 12 (EWHC (Comm) Feb. 13, 2002), available at 2002 WL 346969 (no
pagination available); also available at http://www.lawtel.com (original court transcript with
page numbers) ("[I]t seems to me that it is not of any relevance to the issues which I have to
decide what are the essential features of a Morabaha contract. The fact is that, as Dr.
Samaan states and as I have no reason to think is in any way inaccurate, this contract does
not have the essential characteristics of a Morabaha contract. Furthermore, it is a contract
governed by English law."). See also Umar F. Moghul & Arshad A. Ahmed, Contractual
Forms in Islamic Finance Law and Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony
Gems N. V. & Ors.: 4 First Impression of Islamic Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 150, 188-
89 (2003-2004) (explaining that the goods were sent directly to Symphony Gems, bypassing
Islamic Investment and the fact that Symphony Gems had no right to reject the goods if they
proved to be defective). It should, however, be noted that Symphony Gems could have
waived its Islamic rights and chosen to bear those responsibilities itself, but given the
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contract with Islamic principles was unnecessary in reaching its verdict, the
analysis nonetheless lent a degree of moral support to the decision."' The
court's inclusion of this analysis demonstrates awareness of the sensibilities
of Islamic financiers and their traders and might refute charges of cultural
imperialism and failure to recognize the growing use of Islamic financial
structures.' 12
VI. EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY CLAUSES AND THE MORABAHA
AGREEMENT
Morabaha agreements interpreted under English law risk running
afoul of laws prohibiting unfair contract terms. In many conventional trade
finance arrangements, the financing institution will insist on being insulated
from the sale transaction, because it does not want to assume the risk and
inconvenience of performance of the sale contract." 3 For example, a letter
of credit arrangement achieves the removal of the risk and inconvenience
by entitling a bank merely to participate on the basis of the documents
relating to the sale.' 14 The principle of autonomy' 5 ensures that the bank
unequal bargaining positions of the parties and the absence of clear consent to the waiver,
the required shurut could not be said to be present.
111 Moghul & Ahmed, supra note 110, at 187.
112 See John H. Donboli & Farnaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the Middle East: A Primer
for U.S. Companies, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 413, 418 (2005).
113 See Edward Owen Eng'g Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd., [1978] 1 All E.R. 976, 983
(C.A.) (Eng.); see also R.D. Harbottle v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, [1977] 2 All E.R. 862,
870 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.); see also ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits,
1993, Publication No. 500 (ICC 1993) [hereinafter UCP 500]. Under the UCP 500, banks,
for example, are absolved from responsibility for the effectiveness of the documents (Article
15), for any delays, errors, or failures in the transmission of messages or documents (Article
16), for the usual Acts of God (Article 17) and for errors or failures on the part of advising or
confirming banks they have selected in performing their instructions (Article 18(b)).
Furthermore, the applicant must indemnify the banks against all obligations and
responsibilities imposed by foreign laws and usages (Article 18(d)). The UCP 500 will soon
be superseded by another revision, the UCP 600. See The International Chamber of
Commerce, Banking commission approves revised rules on documentary credits, Oct. 25,
2006, http://www.iccwbo.org/iccjcde/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (addressing
UCP 600 revisions).
114 See UCP 500, supra note 113, art. 4 (stating that the letter of credit is concerned not
with goods, services or other contractual performances, but with documents alone).
115 See id. art. 3:
(a) Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other
contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or
bound by such contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to such contract(s) is
included in the Credit. Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to pay, accept and
pay Draft(s) or negotiate and/or to fulfill any other obligation under the Credit, is
not subject to claims or defenses by the Applicant resulting from his relationship
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needs only to pay or refuse to pay on the basis of the documents. The bank
is not involved with other details of the transaction such as the conformity
of the goods.' 16 It is entitled to reimbursement from the buyer as long as it
is able to demonstrate that the documents tendered by the seller are in
conformity. 117 It is not privy to the sale and would not be subject to the
claims and defenses arising therefrom.
In comparison to conventional trade finance arrangements, a party to a
Morabaha arrangement is not as well insulated, because all participants are
parties to the contract of sale and are therefore liable under the substantive
terms of the sale contract. A financier seeking to avoid this type of liability
might stipulate in the Morabaha agreement that it is not liable under the
contract of sale to the beneficiary of the financing (namely, the ultimate
buyer) and that it would be merely liable to the supplier for payment of the
price. Without this type of limitation, Morabaha agreements might not be
commercially feasible. This limitation of liability would be delineated in the
contract between the financer and beneficiary. For example, the financing
institution in Symphony Gems was made contractually exempt from liability
for any "defect, deficiency or any loss" in the goods." 8 In other words, the
contract eliminated the financing institution's liability for the condition or
quantity of the goods or the description of the goods or any other terms
which the buyer (Symphony) might have agreed to with the gem suppliers.
Such an exclusion could run afoul of the provisions of the Sale of Goods
Act 1979119 dealing with the implied terms of title to sell, 120 quiet
with the Issuing Bank of the Beneficiary. (b) A Beneficiary can in no case avail
himself of the contractual relationship existing between the banks or between the
Applicant and the Issuing Bank.
See, e.g., Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Indus. Ltd., [1958] 2 Q.B. 127 (C.A.)
(Eng.); see also Equitable Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Dawson Partners Ltd., [1927] 2 Lloyd's List
L.R. 49 (H.L.) (U.K.); see also Gian Singh & Co. Ltd. v. Banque de L'Indochine, [1974] 1
W.L.R. 1234 (P.C.) (U.K.).
116 On the principle of autonomy, see generally Edward Owen Eng'g Ltd. v. Barclays
Bank Int'l Ltd., [1978] 1 All E.R. 976 (C.A.) (Eng.).
117 See, e.g., Kwei Tek Chao and Others (Trading as Zung Fu Co.) v. British Traders and
Shippers Ltd., [1954] 1 All E.R. 779 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.) (noting that the shipping documents
(such as the bill of lading) revealed that the goods were shipped late); see also New Chinese
Antimony Co. v. Ocean Steamship Co., [1917] 1 K.B. 664 (C.A.) (Eng.) (noting that the
quantity did not correspond with the contract quantity); see also C. Groom, Ltd. v. Barber,
[1915] 1 K.B. 316 (K.B.D.) (Eng.) (noting that the insurance cover where required was
inadequate); see also J.H. Rayner & Co. v. Hambros Bank Ltd., [1943] K.B. 37 (Eng.)
(noting that the description of the goods did not correspond with the contract description).
118 Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems NV, 2001 Folio
1226, slip. op. at 5 (EWHC (Comm) Feb. 13, 2002), available at 2002 WL 346969 (no
pagination available); also available at http://www.lawtel.com (original court transcript with
page numbers).
119 Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54 (U.K.).
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possession, 12' description,1 22 and satisfactory quality. 2 3 Parties can never
contractually agree to waive or restrict the conditions of title to sell and
quiet possession. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977124 states that
description and quality liability under non-consumer contracts of sale "can
be excluded or restricted by reference to a contract term, but only in so far
as the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness."'
' 25
120 Id. § 12(1) (providing that "there is an implied condition on the part of the seller that
in the case of sale, he has a right to sell the goods, and in the case of an agreement to sell, he
will have a right to sell the goods at a time when property is to pass"); see Niblett, Ltd. v.
Confectioners' Materials Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 387 (C.A.) (Eng.) (holding that where the goods
sold had infringed a third party's trademark, the seller could not be said to have a right to sell
those goods).
121 Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54, § 12(2) (U.K.) (stating that "there is also an implied
warranty that--(a) the goods are free, and will remain free until the time when the property
is to pass, from any charge or encumbrance not disclosed or known to the buyer when the
contract is made, and (b) the buyer will enjoy quiet possession of the goods except so far as
it may be disturbed by the owner or other person entitled to the benefit of any charge or
encumbrance so disclosed or known"); see Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria
Azucarera Nacional S.A., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171 (C.A.) (Eng.) (holding that as the seller
had connived at securing a governmental decision to withdraw and seize the goods already
sold, that was sufficient to constitute a breach of§ 12(2)(b)).
122 Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54, § 13(1) (U.K.) (stating that where there is a contract
for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied condition that the goods will
correspond with the description, and that if the sale is by sample as well as by description it
is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods correspond with the sample if the goods do not
also correspond with the description). See Ashmore & Son v. C.S. Cox & Co., [1899] 1
Q.B. 436 (Eng.) (holding that in international sales, especially documentary sales, a
stipulation as to time for shipment will form part of the description of the goods, and failure
to ship within the shipment period would constitute a breach of condition).
123 See generally Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54, § 14 (U.K.).
124 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50 (U.K.).
125 Id. § 6(3). See also id. § 6(3), sched. 2. Schedule 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977 lays down some guidelines to ascertain what meets the requirement of reasonableness:
The matters to which regard is to be had in particular... are any of the following
which appear to be relevant-
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties relative to each
other, taking into account (among other things) alternative means by
which the customer's requirements could have been met;
(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term or in
accepting it had an opportunity of entering into a similar contract with
other persons, but without having to accept a similar term;
(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the
existence and extent of the term (having regard, among other things, to
any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealings between the
parties);
(d) where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some
condition is not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of
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Are the exclusions in Morabaha agreements, such as those in
Symphony Gems, reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977?
One indicator of reasonableness is that the customer has been given an
inducement to accept the so-called unfair contract term.1 26 Because the
bank would not have financed the customer without the exclusion or
limitation of liability clauses, the financing itself might be thought of as
inducement to accept these limiting contract terms. Another indicator of
reasonableness is awareness or knowledge of the unfair contract term in
question. 127 Parties to Morabaha agreements should be fully aware of the
need for such clauses in order to make the agreements commercially viable.
Additionally, the parties specifically opted for a Morabaha agreement
instead of a traditional commercial letter of credit arrangement in order to
comply with Islamic law. It would be hard to argue that parties choosing a
specific form of contract are unaware of the terms of that contract.
Therefore, both indicators of the reasonableness exclusion or limitation of
liability clauses are present.
On the other hand, some Islamic jurists have commented that a true
Morabaha agreement cannot contractually limit the financer's duties as a
seller. Even if the Morabaha has alternate uses as a financing instrument, it
is still, in essence, a sale contract, and it is not acceptable to modify a
Morabaha agreement to mimic a conventional financial instrument. 128 In
other words, a Morabaha agreement is sui generis and should thus be
recognized and applied as such. An English court adopting this view might
find it harder to allow the terms excluding or limiting liability under the
Sale of Goods Act 1979, because the indicators supporting a finding of
reasonableness (inducement and knowledge/awareness) are far less
persuasive if the resulting instrument is not viewed by Islamic jurists as a
true Morabaha agreement.
The analysis under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 may not apply
in all cases. International supply contracts are excluded from its scope.
An "international supply contract" is defined as "(a) either [] a contract of
sale of goods or [] one under or in pursuance of which the possession or
ownership of goods passes; and (b) it is made by parties whose places of
business (or, if they have none, habitual residences) are in the territories of
the contract to expect that compliance with that condition would be
practicable;
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the
special order of the customer.
Id.
126 Id. § 6(3), sched. 2(b).
127 Id. § 6(3), sched. 2(c).
128 See generally Moghul & Ahmed, supra note 110, at 172-74.
129 See Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 26 (U.K.).
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different states."' 130 Additionally, an international supply contract must also
meet one of the following conditions:
(a) the goods are, at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, in the course of carriage, or will be carried,
from the territory of one state to the territory of another;
or
(b) the acts constituting the offer and acceptance have been
done in the territories of different states; or
(c) the contract provides for the goods to be delivered in the
territory of a state other than that within whose territory
those acts were done.'
31
Exclusion and limitation of liability clauses in international supply
contracts would therefore not be subject to the reasonableness test laid
down by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Without this reasonableness
test, exclusion and limitation of liability clauses will be valid so long as
they have been properly incorporated into the contract. 1
32
It is often the case that the financing bank and the ultimate buyer are
established in the same country. For example, an importer based in the
United Kingdom seeking a Morabaha agreement for financing is likely to
work with a financing bank established in the United Kingdom as well. As
the contracting parties are within the same state, the exclusion in Section 26
of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 would not apply, and the contract is
subject to a reasonableness test. 133 The same analysis applies to Morabaha
agreements, even if the goods are actually "bought" from a foreign third
party supplier, because the relevant contracting parties for the Section 26
exclusion are the importer and financing bank, not the importer and the
supplier.Moreover, Section 26 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 refers to
an international sale of goods contract.1 34 Is a Morabaha agreement a sale
of goods contract? In Shamil Bank, because the court insisted on some
130 Id. § 26(3).
131 Id. § 26(4).
132 Where the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 does not apply, the validity of the
exclusion or limitation of liability clause will be determined by the common law. Under the
common law, there is no test for reasonableness or unconscionability. The courts will
approach the contractual clause purely as a matter of construction. See Photo Prod. Ltd. v.
Securicor Transp. Ltd., [1980] A.C. 827 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (rejecting
reliance on a fundamental breach doctrine to negate an "unfair" clause, and holding that it
was fallacious to assume that such a clause would not exclude liability for a fundamental
duty; whether or not an exclusion clause applied to a breach, whether fundamental or not,
was a matter of construction of the clause in question).
133 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 26 (U.K.).
134 Id
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genuine connection between the bank and the subject matter, it was clear
that the court interpreted the Morabaha agreement as a sales contract
instead of a finance instrument. 135  A court will not assume that all
agreements expressed to be Morabaha agreements are sales contracts; it
makes this determination based on the facts of the individual case. 136
VII. IMPORTING ISLAMIC CONCEPTS OF FAIRNESS INTO
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
If the scope of a court's reasonableness inquiry expands from
individual contract terms to evaluation of the contract as a whole, a court
might consider broader Islamic concepts of fairness when evaluating the
fairness of the contract. If it is clear that the parties to a contract had
expectations of performance based on Islamic principles, and intended to
contract based on those principles, a court should incorporate analysis of
Islamic principles in its evaluation of the fairness of the contract. Ignoring
the relevance of those principles would prevent a court from gaining a
complete understanding of the full factual matrix of the contract at issue. 37
From a policy standpoint, incorporating Islamic principles in a fairness
evaluation would address criticism that western courts are making Islamic
jurisprudence irrelevant to issues of Islamic finance. 138
VIII. EXTRA-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ISLAMIC FINANCE
CONTRACTS
Many financing arrangements in the Middle East and elsewhere in the
Islamic world require monitoring by a religious supervisory board. 139 The
parties must agree by contract to give force to the decisions and
recommendations made by the relevant board. This can be accomplished by
allowing appropriate sanctions. 140 Alternatively, the parties may give the
... [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [13]-[17], [47] (Eng.).
136 An English court would not accept a label as determinative of the character of the
contract. See, e.g., Comptoir D'Achat et de Vente du Boerenbond Belge S/A v. Luis de
Ridder Limitada, [1949] A.C. 293, 293-94 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (holding
that despite the contract in question being labeled and referred to as an Ex Ship contract, it
was in substance a CIF contract).
137 See, e.g., Phillips Products Ltd. v. Hyland, [1987] 2 All E.R. 620 (C.A.) (Eng.)
(holding that in examining whether the test of reasonableness has been satisfied, the court
has to determine all of the relevant circumstances and whether those circumstances were or
should have been known to or contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was
made).
138 See, e.g., Moghul & Ahmed, supra note 110, at 183 (providing a criticism thereof).
139 Such religious supervisory boards might operate under the state's auspices or within
the bank's own internal structure.
140 See, e.g., Shamil Bank of Bahr. EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd., [2003] EWHC (Comm)
2118, [21] (Eng.) (noting that the bank's articles of association stated that "[t]he Religious
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board power to order a new contract to replace an existing one and to make
relevant changes to the contract, even after the contract has been made.
14 1
In Shamil Bank, the system of religious supervision was ineffective because
it applied to the general activities of the bank instead of the specific
agreements into which the bank entered.
142
While direct monitoring of agreements by a religious supervisory
board might be more effective, this option is not entirely free from practical
difficulties or doctrinal controversy. The involvement of a religious
supervisory board not only lengthens and complicates the negotiation and
contracting process, it also leads to commercial uncertainty because the
board may be given the ability to re-write the contract. 143 Decisions of a
religious supervisory board might be questioned before the Islamic courts
or religious authorities of the countries in question, further reducing the
certainty of contracts between parties.144
Supervisory Board shall ascertain that the Company's investments and activities (and the
activities of its subsidiary and affiliated companies) conform with the principles and
provisions of Islamic Sharia'a. It shall, in particular, discuss with the members of the Board
of Directors, managers of the Company or of any subsidiary or affiliated company under its
control, such conformity and the business carried out by them and shall request any
information it deems necessary. In particular, the Religious Supervisory Board shall adopt all
the crucial decisions for applying the provisions of Islamic Sharia to ensure the realization of
the objects for which the Company was incorporated. Also, to ensure that the members of
the Board of Directors, managers and employees are coordinating their activities according
to such decisions which shall be binding upon all the shareholders. The Religious
Supervisory Board shall within six months from the end of the Company's financial year,
submit a written report stating that it fulfilled the obligations indicated herein and
ascertained that the Company's investments and business activities (including its subsidiary
companies) conform with the provisions of Islamic Sharia. The Religious Supervisory
Board shall appoint-upon the nomination by the Chief Executive-a Sharia Supervisor
who shall act as the Secretary of the Religious Supervisory Board. He need not be a member
of the Religious Supervisory Board. The Board of Directors shall take the necessary actions
to ensure that all the investments and other business transactions have been referred to the
Religious Supervisory Board for approval before carrying out any other business
transactions by the Company or by any subsidiary or affiliate company under its control.").
141 The Religious Supervisory Board in some countries may issue Fatwas ordering that a
non-Islamic instrument be voided and replaced. See, e.g., Meezan Bank Ltd.-FAQ,
available at http://www.meezanbank.com//en/islamicbankingfaq.aspx (last visited Oct. 10,
2006) (describing the responsibilities of the bank's Sharia Supervisory Board, including
"directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of the Meezan Bank in order to ensure
that they are in compliance with Islamic Sharia Rules and Principles. The fatwas, and rulings
of the Sharia Supervisory Board are binding on the bank.").
142 Shamil Bank of Bahr. EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd., [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2118,
[51]-[52] (noting that the powers of the bank's religious supervisory board were not
expressed or incorporated into the financing agreement, but in the bank's Articles of
Association).
141 Id. [21]-[22].
144 See, e.g., TheDailyStar.com, DGFI, Islamic Parties Against BB Guidelines for Islamic
Banking, THE DAILY STAR, July 3, 2006, available at
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IX. CONCLUSION
Shamil Bank confirms that the Rome Convention does not allow non-
country specific law to be the applicable law of the contract. Parties to a
contract cannot choose Sharia law per se or English law as guided by
Sharia principles. One possible solution, therefore, is that parties operating
in the U.K. market who wish to deal on Islamic principles should adopt
choice of law provisions that incorporate the law of a country that most
closely gives effect to the Sharia principles with which they are
concerned. 145 However, English law and English private international law,
as contained in Article 10(2) of the Rome Convention, encourages courts to
consider the law of the jurisdiction where performance takes place. 146 This
means that a court may hesitate to apply a choice of law provision with a
result that would contravene the applicable law in the place of performance.
Therefore, the obstacle presented by Article 10(2) and the foreign illegality
principle would have to be overcome in order for this to be an effective
solution to the incorporation of Islamic principles in a contract.
Alternatively, parties can adopt a clause subjecting the contract to a set
of expressed terms and conditions compliant with Islamic principles, such
as a code of industry practice adopted by Islamic banks, or a specific set of
rules established by an individual Islamic bank. 147 Regardless of the fact
that the terms might draw on Islamic law and practice, incorporation of the
terms into the contract is permissible under English law because the
relevant terms are clearly identifiable. However, the incorporation of
Islamic principles as a matter of contract might be perceived by some as the
relegation of Islamic law to nothing more than a set of contractual terms.
This can cause problems for the Islamic financiers seeking to secure the
business of more orthodox Islamic traders, and their stakeholders, who are
unhappy to see Islamic law being treated as less than binding legal rules
which should be accorded the same recognition as the law of a sovereign
http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/07/03/d6070301033.htm (reporting the disagreement
between banks and the Bangladeshi Islamic Supervisory Council (set up by the Government)
over matters of interpretation). Indeed, the Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance,
London, has seen fit to publish a selection of such Sharia rulings. See A COMPENDIUM OF
LEGAL OPINIONS ON THE OPERATIONS OF ISLAMIC BANKS (Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo ed., 1997).
145 In Shamil Bank, Bahrain, while embracing and encouraging Islamic banking practice
as a national policy, did not incorporate the principles of Islamic law, in particular the
prohibition of riba, into its commercial law, and there is an absence of any legal prescription
as to what does and does not constitute "Islamic" banking or finance. In other Middle
Eastern countries, banking interest is tolerated (Saudi Arabia) and even sanctioned by
banking laws (Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, for example). See, e.g., COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE
ARAB MIDDLE EAST: THE GULF STATES 133 (W.M. Ballantyne ed., 1986).
146 See Rome Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(2).
147 Adding specific Islamic-compliant contract language usually occurs after consultation
with the country's religious authorities and/or the bank's own Religious Supervisory Board.
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foreign state.
The failure to incorporate Islamic principles into a Morabaha contract
means that the contract is open to be treated solely by English law.
148
Serious implications arise as a result. First, that means the contract is likely
to be treated as a sale of goods contract 149 subject to the Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977150 and the Sale of Goods Act 1979.151 Second, although an
argument can be made that the "restrictive" terms of the Morabaha might
satisfy the reasonableness test of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977,152 it
is by no means incontrovertible. Third, a Morabaha agreement, though
involving the import of foreign goods, could very well be classified as a
domestic contract under Section 26 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
because the importer and the financing bank are based in the same
country.153 In such a case, the Morabaha contract could not evade the
provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977154 in order to benefit
from the common law's lax approach to exclusion and limitation of liability
clauses contained in international supply contracts.
1 55
Globalization will require the international commercial environment to
recognize and integrate both Islamic and conventional forms of commerce
and finance. Courts in non-Islamic countries must therefore rise to the
challenge of giving proper effect to Islamic financing or commercial
arrangements. The challenge for international commercial lawyers is to
find a way to incorporate Islamic principles in a manner in which the courts
would be able, both legally and practically, give effect. No English court
will enforce an ambiguous or unclear legal and commercial instrument,
whether compliant with Islam or not. More debate is needed on whether
and to what extent lawyers who, having recognized the distinctive
expectations of Islamic traders, should westernize the contracts by using
hermetically sealed choice of law or other clauses. Such an approach may
pre-empt the problems following a dispute, but it adds little to facilitate the
smooth performance of the contract. While this article has focused on
crafting Islamic-compliant contracts that survive judicial scrutiny, the
contract drafter must also focus on the clear articulation of the expectations
148 See Shamil Bank of Bahr. EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd., [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2118.
149 Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharms. Ltd., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19, [13]-
[17], [47] (Eng.).
150 See Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50 (U.K.).
151 Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54 (U.K.).
152 See Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 26 (U.K.).
153 id.
154 See Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50 (U.K.).
155 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. See also Photo Prod. Ltd. v. Securicor
Transp. Ltd., [1980] A.C. 827, 846-51 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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of the parties so as to ensure success of the commercial transaction. 156
156 See Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law-the Lex
Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 125 (Julian
D.M. Lew ed., 1987) ("[L]aw is not only made of and for disputes .. ").
